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TRUSTS-SALE AND REINVESTMENT OF TRUST PROPERTY
IN VIOLATION OF THE DIRECTIONS OF THE TESTATOR-
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-KELLY v. MARR
In the recent case, Kelly v. Marr,' real estate was devised in trust,
one-half interest to be held for A and one-fourth interest each for
B and C. Each devisee was to hold during life the net income from
the real estate to be paid in the stated proportions. It was further
provided that the interest devised to A should pass, upon his death, in
fee simple, per stirpes to his issue, if any, surviving. Should there
be no issue, then to pass to the other named devisees in equal por-
tions, to be held in trust during their lives, then to their issue per
stirpes, they to take in fee simple, with like provisions as to remain-
ders in respect of the shares devised to B and C. In the same clause
of the will there was a provision that:
"Neither my said trustee nor any of the above named bene-
ficiaries during their lives shall have the power to sell, mortgage
or encumber the trust property or to anticipate the income."
Just thirteen months after the will was probated and less than
three years after its execution, suit was instituted seeking a decree
of sale of the devised lands. Plaintiffs were the life tenants in their
own proper persons, A and B also suing as statutory guardians of
their respective children, all under twenty-one years of age. The
trustee was defendant. The basis stated for the sale was that the
devised real estate: (1) is not susceptible of division without im-
pairing the value of the whole, or the several interests; (2) the
income from the property is and has been insufficient to keep up
fixed charges against it; (3) the interests of the life tenants are
consumed by necessary expenses of care and maintenance, and the
interests of the remaindermen are rapidly depreciating because
of insufficient income to maintain the properties in reasonable re-
pair. The prayer was for sale and reinvestment of the proceeds. The
trustee answered by admission of the allegations" of the petition.
The chancellor decreed a sale by the commissioner at public
out-cry, the proceeds to be reinvested by the trustee under further
orders of the Court. Kelly, the appellant, was the successful bidder
and the sale was approved by the chancellor. On appeal this action
was affirmed.
The action was brought under a statute providing:
"The real property or any right, title or interest in real
property of a person under the age of twenty-one years ... may
be sold under or by a decree of a Court of Equity . . . for any
purpose deemed by the chancellor to be necessary or proper or
beneficial to such person under disability."
and in reaching its result the Court emphasized that statute.
1299 Ky. 447, 185 S. W. 2d 945 (1945).
'KENTUCKY CIVM CODE (Carroll, 1938) sec. 489, Supp. 1945.
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There was no question of interpreting ambiguous language. The
testator plainly and unequivocally prohibited the sale of the property
during the existence of the trust. The issue directly raised was, does
the Court have the power to decree the sale and reinvestment of
trust property regardless of the terms of the trust? That question was
answered in the affirmative, with reliance on the statute as the
source of such power. The question was before the Court for the first
time under the present statute when raised in the principal case.
The result of the interpretation placed on the statute is to allow
the Kentucky chancellor an unusually broad discretion in the sale
and reinvestment of trust property which the settlor provides shall
,not be sold for a specified time.
It is probably true that there is no jurisdiction in which a testa-
tor will be able to stay absolutely the hand of the court by provid-
ing that property devised in trust may not be sold.3 Even in the
absence of statutory authority, a court of equity may through its
inherent jurisdiction over trusts, decree a sale for reinvestment of
trust property under certain conditions, despite the prohibition by
the testator.4 Generally, however, such a decree will issue only if the
terms of the trust prove to be impossible of performance;' or if
the sale is necessary to prevent the destruction of the trust res;' or
if due to a change in circumstances, conditions exist which the tes-
tator could not have known or contemplated Where such a varia-
tion in the terms of the trust is authorized by the court it is done, not
as representing what the testator intended, but as being what he
-probably would have intended could he have foreseen the circum-
stances that have arisen. The objects will generally be accomplished
,as nearly according to the terms of the instrument as is consistent
with the interests of the trust estate and the beneficiaries.' The mere
-fact, however, that a change of investment would be beneficial to
,the beneficiaries, or to the trust estate, is not sufficient to authorize
-a -decree in violation of the te9tator's direction that the property
should not be sold.'
'SCoTT,'TiTfSTS (1939) sec. 167.
SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) sec. 190.4.-
'Banker's Trust-Co2 of N. Y. v. Greims, 108 Conn. 259,142 Atl.
,796 <1928).
I Dallas Art League v. Weaver, 240 Ala. 432, 199 So. 831 (1941);
Scriter v. McWard, 328 Ill. 462, 159 N. E. 799 (1928); Gavin v. Curtin,
171 Ill. 640, 49 N. E. 523 (1898); In re Rothwell's Estate. Rothwell
v. Rothwell, 283 Mass. 563, 186 N. E. 662 (1933); Fidelity Union
Trust Co. v. Sayre, 41 Ati. 2d 388 (N. J. 1945). Cf. Simon v. Simon,
26 F.(2d) 530 (C.A.D.C. 1928).
'Security First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles v. Easter, 136 Cal. App.
691, 29 P. 2d 422 (1934); Young v. Young, 255 Mich. 173,237 N. W.
535 (1931); Cutter v. American Trust Co., 213 N. C. 686, 197 S. E.
542 (1938) (Variation of irrevocable trust at suit of settlor).
t ScoTT, TRUSTS (1939) sec. 167.
9ScoTT, -TRuSTS (1939) sec. 167; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935)
sec. 190, comment (F). See Farmers & Merchants' Nat. Bank of Los
Angeles v. Reed, 91 P. 2d 944 (Cal., 1939).
STUDENT NOTES
Trust instruments may be placed in three classes as regards
authority to sell the trust property:
1. The trustee is given a power of sale.
2. The instrument is silent on the subject of selling the property
and the trustee is not given a power of sale, nor is there a di-
rection not to sell.
3. The settlor provides that the property shall not be sold.
If the trustee is given a power of sale there is no problem as he
can convey good title to the property without the aid of the court.0
In both of the other classes, however, a sale if made must be au-
thorized by the court, but ordinarily a decree will issue on less
provocation where there is a mere failure to give a power of sale
than where there is a direction that the property shall not be sold."
The principal case leaves no opportunity for such a distinction. While
the general allegations of the plaintiff were broad enough to satisfy
the requirements of a stricter jurisdiction, the proof and the facts
relied upon by the Court were to the effect that after paying fixed
charges there was little or nothing left for distribution and further
that because of the inflated market a sale and reinvestment could
result in the purchase of land better adapted to the growing of the
principal crop, burley tobacco.' The substance of these facts is that
it was not necessary to sell the trust property but that a change of
investment might be of advantage to the beneficiaries. There was no
indication that the condition of the real estate market had changed
in any way since the death of the testator.
In a later case' a degree for sale of real estate for reinvestment,
at the suit of the life tenants against infant contingent remainder-
men then in being, was affirmed although no facts were alleged or
proved to show that such a change in investment would benefit the
remaindermen on the ground that section 489 of the Code authorized
the chancellor to decree a sale and reinvestment for any purpose
which he deemed necessary or proper and that the statute does not
require a showing that the sale be beneficial to the remainderman
or reversioner. This is an extension of the authority recognized in
Kelly v. Marr and apparently arises from the wording of the statute
'SCOTT, TRUSTS (1939) sec. 190.
'There obviously can be no holding on this point but cf. Orr v.
Orr, 197 Ga. 866, 30 S. E. 2d 900 (1944); McBride v. Bullard, 4
S. h. 2d 149 (Ga. 1939); Wingard v. Hennessee, 206 S. C. 159, 33 S. E.
2d 390 (1945); Kirton v. Howard, 137 S. C. 11, 134 S. E. 859 (1926) in
which sale was not prohibited with cases in notes 5 & 7 supra in
which sale was prohibited by the trust instrument. This distinction
is recognized by statute in Connecticut (Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown,
105 Conn. 261, 135 Atl. 555 (1926); Gen. St. 1930, sec. 4835). It
should be mentioned that while the principal case involved a de-
cretal sale there was no attempt made therein to distinguish decretal
sales from private or public sales by the trustee.
"2 299 Ky. 447 at 450, 185 S. W. 2d 945 at 947.
"Poindexter v. Brumagen, 301 Ky. 699, 192 S. W. 2d 960 (1946).
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"for any purpose deemed by the chancellor to be necessary or proper
or beneficial to such person under disability" and any one of these,
"necessary, "proper" or "beneficial" seems to be sufficient to
authorize the chancellor to decree a sale without too much emphasis
being placed on the last phrase of the statute "to such person under
disability."
The only deduction to be made is that Kentucky is a liberal
jurisdiction for decretal sales of trust property whatever the ex-
pressed intention of a testator may be. There seems to be no reason-
able assurance that a remainder beneficiary after a life tenant will
receive the particular property devised in trust. It is questionable,
however, whether Kentucky's position was appreciably altered by
the Code amendment referred to. An act1 dealing specifically with
trust property provides for the sale of any interest therein when it
is found by the chancellor to be beneficial to the beneficiaries. While
the statute does not expressly refer to property which the testator
directed not to be sold, it was treated as if it did so by the Court. In
Rousseau v. Page's Executrix" land was devised in trust for certain
life tenants with remainder over under a provision that one of the
life tenants could not sell his interest. In affirming a decree for sale
and reinvestment on the ground that the life tenant and the re-
maindermen would be benefitted thereby it was held that a restraint
on the sale by the life tenant does not bind the chancellor. In
Consolidated Realty Co. v. Norton's Trustees" the trustee was auth-
orized to sell trust property contrary to restrictions in the trust in-
strument based upon facts being proved to establish that the sale
was in the interest of the beneficiaries.
Since the Code amendment" was construed to include trust prop-
erty there is perhaps little need remaining for the Act of 1882"3 but
it seems that the Kentucky Court has always been more inclined to
encourage the sale and reinvestment of trust property than have
other courts and that the decision in Kelly v. Marr is a re-emphasis
of that position rather than a variation brought about by statute.
FRED B. REDWINE
Referred to as Act of 1882, found in KENTUCKY CIVIL CODE
(Carroll, 1938), after sec. 491.
15150 Ky. 812, 150 S. W. 983 (1912).
"214 Ky. 586, 283 S. W. 969 (1926).
'7KENTUCKY CIVIL CODE (Carroll, 1938) sec. 489.
'This statute authorizes private sales by the trustee subject to
approval by the court. It is, therefore, probably valuable in cases
where a private sale by the trustee is more advantageous than a
decretal sale would be.
